Comments and thoughts of an American Muslim on US Foreign policy in the Middle East and the so-called War on Terror,examining the contradictions from a perspective of justice, fairness and human rights.
“This is a wonderful outcome for a great number of our employees that will preserve and strengthen our terrific franchise,” - Richard S. Fuld, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Lehman Brothers on the Barclay takeover.[i]
“The catalyst for this current crisis may be the housing market, but the larger culprit is the killing of [the] Glass-Steagall [Act], which paved the way for this recklessness.” - Economist and former Lehman Brothers employee Nomi Prins.[ii]
When Enron collapsed in December 2001, thousands of employees lost their jobs and retirement savings, prompting the US Congressional Research Service to report, “The swift and unanticipated collapse of such a large corporation suggests basic problems with the U.S. system of securities regulation.” Enron’s core business was the trading of esoteric financial instruments called “derivatives”[iii] and once again, these largely unregulated investments lie at the heart of the current US financial meltdown.
The next hint of “basic problems” was the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,[iv] whose assets and $1.45 billion of real estate holdings are being acquired by Barclay’s Capital for $250 million, and a $500 million operating loan.[v] Shortly afterwards, the US Federal Reserve announced an $85 billion rescue for American International Group (AIG.)
This follows Bear Sterns and two Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), whose bailouts may cost taxpayers $900 billion.[vi] And now Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last two remaining investment banks, are restructuring as commercial banks.[vii] Does this mean the end of Enron economics?
Behind this capitalist catastrophe is the mixing of commercial banks that provide public banking services, and investment banks that underwrite securities for corporations. If the two are linked, the holding company can exert pressure on the commercial bank to make loans using the investment bank’s risky securities as collateral.[viii]
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, passed in the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash, prohibited commercial banks from underwriting securities. Pushed by the Reagan administration, the Federal Reserve eased Glass-Steagall restrictions in 1987 despite objections by Chairman Paul Volker.[ix] In 1999, Congress yielded to lobbying by financial interests and repealed the law, thus eliminating these safeguards.[x]
Defaults on US subprime mortgages, higher risk mortgages granted to people with lower credit ratings,[xi] initiated the current crisis in early 2005.[xii] Concern was minimal until August 2007, when US and European banks became alarmed at the difficulty of valuing their holdings of derivatives collateralized by subprime mortgages.[xiii] Valuing derivatives was also a core issue in the Enron collapse.[xiv]
Derivatives are contracts that derive value from other financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, commodities, interest rates or mortgages.[xv] The simplest mortgage derivatives are Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), bonds backed by pools of similar mortgages, whose interest and principle payments are passed on to investors. The US government guarantees GSE-issued MBSs, but those issued by the private sector are not,[xvi] and by 2006, 71% were backed by subprime mortgages.[xvii]
Next in complexity are Interest Only/Principle Only (IO/PO) derivatives. An IO derivative passes on interest payments from the underlying MBS bond whereas a PO derivative passes on principle payments. Both alter the risks involved, for suppose the MBS is paid off in a year. A $100,000 PO purchased at a discount for $60,000 would pay the full principle for a 66.7% return, while a $100,000 IO with an interest rate of 5% would only pay $5,000.[xviii] In financial parlance, the IO derivative has higher prepayment risk than the PO. Both derivatives have interest rate risk, should rates rise or fall, and also default risk if mortgage borrowers are unable to make payments.
More complicated are Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMO), derivatives prioritized by principle payoff. Derivatives in the first priority group or “tranche” are paid off first, then those in the second are paid off and so on, but all tranches receive interest payments. The first tranche has the least default risk; the last tranche has the most. Varying interest rates and principle distribution among the tranches creates a wide range of risks to suit the “risk appetites” of investors. Collateralized Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) are similar to CMOs but are even more convoluted.
The process begins when an originator creates a mortgage and sells it to either a GSE (44% of US mortgages) or a private sector firm (56% of US mortgages.)[xix] The buyer collateralizes MBS bonds from pools of similar mortgages and sells them to an investment bank, which in turn sells them to an intermediary such as a trust that they have created, an Enron-style ruse to keep derivatives off the investment bank’s books.[xx] To finance its purchase of MBSs, the intermediary packages CMO or CMBS derivatives, and sells them back to the investment bank, which markets them to investors.[xxi]
In theory, this arcane financial chicanery, called “securitization,”[xxii] benefits homebuyers since the variety of risk attracts more investors thus providing more capital for mortgages. In practice however, the complex financial instruments encourage predatory loan originators to profit by selling mortgages that borrowers are unable to afford.[xxiii]
The Bank for International Settlements warns, “the magnitude of the problems yet to be faced could be much greater than many now perceive.”[xxiv] Enron economics may have ended, but Wall Street welfare continues as the US Treasury proposes multi-billion dollar bailouts for wealthy investors,[xxv] while the rest of us pay for their fiscal malfeasance.
Yuram Abdullah Weiler
2008-09-25
[i] Press Release, Lehman Brothers, 16 September 2008, http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/0916_barclays_acquisition.pdf (Accessed 17 September 2008)
[ii] Nomi Prins, A Taste of the Glass-Steagall Lash for Lehman, Mother Jones, 16 September 2008, Posted on CommonDreams, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2008/09/16-4 (Accessed 17 September 2008)
[iii] Mark Jickling, The Enron Collapse: An Overview of Financial Issues, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2 February 2002, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8038.pdf (Accessed 19 September 2008)
[iv] Press Release, Lehman Brothers, 15 September 2008, http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/091508_lbhi_chapter11_filed.pdf (Accessed 17 September 2008)
[v] Press Release, Lehman Brothers, 16 September 2008, op.cit.
[vi] Emily Kaiser, After AIG Rescue, Fed May Find More At Its Door, Reuters, 17 September 2008, Posted on Common Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2008/09/17 (Accessed 18 September 2008)
[vii] Christine Harper and Craig Torres, Goldman, Morgan Stanley Bring Down Curtain on an Era (Update3), Bloomberg, 22 September 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aoDmO_d0IJSU&refer=home (Accessed 22 Septermber 2008)
[viii] Randall Dodd, Testimony before the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 11 April 2006, http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_viewpoints_industrial_loan_banks_testimony (Accessed 21 September 2008)
[ix] Alison Raphael, Only Real Fix Is Regulatory, Analysts Say, Interpress Service, 19 September 2008, Posted on Common Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2008/09/19 (Accessed 19 September 2008)
[x] The Wall Street Fix: The Long Demise of Glass-Steagall, Frontline, 8 May 2003, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html (Accessed 17 September 2008)
[xi] Glossary, The National Community Reinvestment Coalition, http://www.ncrc.org/fairlending/glossary.htm (Accessed 18 September 2008)
[xii] BIS 78th Annual Report, The Bank for International Settlements, 30 June 2008, Introduction, page 4, http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2008e1.pdf (Accessed 18 September 2008)
[xiii] BIS 78th Annual Report, op.cit., page 4.
[xiv] Mark Jickling, CRS, op.cit.
[xv] Fundamentals: What are Derivatives? http://www.financial-guide.ch/ica/derivatives/fundamentals/what_are_derivatives/index.html (Accessed 17 September 2008)
[xvi] Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (Accessed 17 September 2008)
[xvii] Richard J. Rosen, The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Lending, Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, November 2007, http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflnovember2007_244.pdf (Accessed 20 September 2008)
[xviii] Mortgage Derivatives, http://www.belkcollege.uncc.edu/buttimer/MBAD%206160/Mortgage%20Backed%20Securities%20-%20Mortgage%20Derivatives.ppt (Accessed 17 September 2008)
[xix] Richard J. Rosen, op.cit.
[xx] Sam Clifford, Enron style collapse for US banks?, Public Polity, 4 December 2007, http://publicpolity.wordpress.com/2007/12/04/enron-style-collapse-for-us-banks/ (Accessed 19 September 2008)
[xxi] George Oldfield, Making Markets for Structured Mortgage Derivatives, Graduate School of Business Administration, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, March 2000 jfe.rochester.edu/98260.pdf (Accessed 17 September 2008)
[xxii] Richard J. Rosen, op.cit.
[xxiii] BIS 78th Annual Report, op.cit., page 135.
[xxiv] BIS 78th Annual Report, op.cit., page 9.
[xxv] Steven A Reisler, Treasury’s Financial-Bailout Proposal to Congress, AfterDowningStreet.org, 23 September 2008, http://www.afterdowningstreet.org/node/36200 (Accessed 23 September 2008)