whilimena | 05 July, 2006 08:11
THE GANDER SCAM:
"Gander. Nearly 300 slaughtered!!!
In the following overview the reader will note the words 'Islamic Jihad' mentioned. It is worthy to note that this 'Islamic Jihad' was funded by Daddy and the US al Qaeda bureau. The funding involved money and training manuals.
Interestingly, the al Qaeda thugs did not tell us that the Iran hostage-taking was as a result of a HAWK missile deal gone sour - a swindle - just like they did not tell us that they were in business with thugs like Pablo The King Escobar and Manuel Noreiga. Generally our thugs let us think that the foreigners are always the bad guys.
The reader should note that although the following review seem to suggest that the crash was as a result of a foreign terrorist attack, it was actually a 'friendly' enemy fire - done because of what a team (on the flight) participated in and what they knew.
Frankly speaking, a psy-ops team was on board.
For those in the system who fail to take heed; the Family does not leave witnesses alive, don't matter how you believe that you are trusted."
The Whilimena
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"...These great and honored men and women were murdered on that day in Gander Newfoundland and all of the circumstances that surround the opprobrious reasons and the execrable circumstances tie directly to the same insurmountable engendered transgression perpetuated by the same elements of iniquitous deception who have been carrying out so many more heinous acts of sedition against the American and World People..." Will P. Wilson
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Events in Gander, [Newfoundland] -- An Overview
"...December 12, 1985, a military chartered Arrow Air DC-8 ...at Gander International Airport in Gander, Newfoundland. Two-hundred and forty-eight military personnel and eight crew members lost their lives in the accident. As members of the 101st Airborne division stationed in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the servicemen were assigned to rotation as a peacekeeping force in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, enforcing the Camp David Accords of 1978. The accepted theory at the time of the crash was that the plane had crashed due to ice accumulation on the leading surfaces of the wings.
However, recent discoveries and investigations have shown that this crash may not have been caused by ice, but rather by some type of incendiary device placed on the plane. Although the United States and Canadian governments have stood firmly behind their icing theories, many of the unusual events during the preparation for flight, governmental investigations, and toxicology reports point toward a deeper, more hidden, cause behind this tragic accident.
Annex I to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel of 1979 provided for U.N. forces to occupy a portion of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, as observers, between Egypt and Israel. The 101st Airborne division from Fort Campbell, Kentucky was one of four divisions that constituted the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The sole purpose of the MFO was to "operate checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols and observation posts along the international boundary."
Although the MFO was designated solely as a peacekeeping force, many times they were targets of hostile acts by the Islamic Jihad, or Islamic "Holy War," a religious fundamentalist group responsible for various terrorist acts against the United States, such as the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in June of 1985. In February of 1984, the MFO's director, Leamon "Ray" Hunt was gunned down in his car in the streets of Rome, Italy. Officials investigating Hunt's murder pointed the finger of guilt at Lebanese terrorists.
As a result of the Marine barracks bombing, the U.S. began withdrawing its troops from Lebanon, leaving the largest collection of United States troops in the Middle East, concentrated in the Sinai...
Troop Movement and Security
From the moment the troops were destined to leave for home from the Sinai, an unusual sequence of events occurred that have been dismissed as irrelevant. Before this particular movement of troops, all troops serving in the Sinai had departed from the Ras Nasrani airport in the southern part of the Sinai, relatively close to the South Camp set up for the MFO. Yet on this flight, Army officials were notified that this airport would not be available for use by large planes due to construction on the main runway. This meant that the soldiers would be flown by Egypt Air Boeing 737s to the Cairo International Airport, where they would then depart on the larger Arrow Air DC-8...
The unusual events begin to unfold further here, when the pilot of the plane noticed that the Egyptian guard stationed on the ground outside the aircraft would "disappear from his post several times, sometimes for as long as an hour." Captain Arthur Schoppaul also noted that the baggage workers got into a fist fight outside the aircraft, which struck him strangely since Arabs rarely touch one another due to religious beliefs. There was a time when there was no light around the aircraft due to a power cord that had been pulled out on the tarmac...During the loading, there were no U.S. personnel in the cargo holds supervising the contracted Egyptian workers, none of whom had been screened by the U.S. officials...
When the cargo bays of the DC-8 were full, an interesting situation arose; there were still 41 of the soldiers' duffel bags that could not be loaded. Many of the bags were bumped off the plane due to several "large, wooden crates" that were loaded onto the plane first... An Arrow Air manager recalled that Lieut. Colonel Marvin Jeffcoat, the battalion commander, insisted that the boxes be loaded first, and if necessary, that duffel bags be removed to accommodate the boxes, as they contained "very important, military material." (2:146) This struck many of the crew members oddly since it is "unusual to separate a soldier from his equipment." One of the 10 to 20 of these crates had not been transported on the baggage truck with the other baggage and boxes, but had been flown in the belly of one of the 737s to Cairo. (2:147) Where was this box kept while the other baggage in the trucks was being guarded? Despite attempts to identify the contents of these boxes through Army records, no official records of the boxes, or their contents, have been found.
Post - Crash Investigation
The Arrow Air DC-8 departed from the terminal at 6:40 a.m. Gander local time, crashing six minutes later less than a half-mile from the end of runway 22...Army Major Gen. John Crosby arrived in Gander at 3:00 p.m. local time, along with Army personnel to assist the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in their investigative efforts. However, the Army's only role was to assist, and not investigate, at the scene of the accident; this would be done solely by the RCMP. Representatives from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the FBI were also dispatched to the site within hours of the crash.
... In most accidents that involve U.S. citizens, officials probe further to uncover details. In this case, however, many of the officials accepted whatever theories were laid before them by the Canadian officials. The FBI officials were put up in a hotel room for several days, at which time they were informed about the RCMP's findings and told to go home. Information in hand, they departed, leaving a possible crime scene with only the information they were provided -- unprecedented for the Federal Bureau of Investigation...
Two separate eyewitnesses remember General Crosby ordering the "immediate bulldozing of the crash site."...
The Toxicology Reports: Burned Alive
The crash of the Gander flight posed a particular problem for recovery and examination of the bodies of the deceased. Colonel Robert McMeekin, director of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) received notification of the accident at 6:30 a.m. on the morning of December 12. He arrived in Gander at 3:30 p.m. that day. The role of the AFIP was solely identification of U.S. personnel. Under a Memorandum of Understanding signed by Canadian and U.S. officials, the RCMP agreed to release the bodies of the victims to the United States for identification and pathological examination. Any toxicology samples would be taken and shipped to Canada for testing; no testing was to be done in the U.S. Thus, the bodies were moved to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware for examination...According to many pathologists, an accident cannot be listed as a cause of death, but only as a contributor to death. Actual death can only be by decapitation, etc. Listing the deaths as "instantaneous" would appease many of the families -- that is, until the Elcombe report was released.
Dr. David Elcombe, director of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB), released the Canadians' toxicological findings on March 5, 1986, although they were not presented at any public hearings. These results presented problems for the "instantaneous" death theory posed by Dr. McMeekin...To make this important piece of evidence fit into the accepted "no explosion" theory, the survival time after the crash was increased from zero seconds to almost five minutes. The families were being asked to deal with the nightmarish possibility that their loved ones sat living, within a fiery inferno of jet fuel for almost five minutes. Interestingly, many of the bodies that had high levels of combustion products in their lungs were also decapitated, yet according to the official report, they somehow kept breathing five minutes after being dismembered. This could be exactly why Dr. Elcombe sent a memo to Dr. McMeekin dated June 20, 1986 stating: "Some of the carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide values are striking ... and I look forward to meeting with you ... to consider their significance."
Arms to Iran: Enter One Oliver North
Many people have questioned the true mission of the 3rd battalion of the 101st Airborne deployed to the Sinai. There are some theories surrounding the contents of the mysterious "wooden boxes" loaded into the DC-8 in Cairo, and their relation to the Iran-Contra affair involving Oliver North. Others will point out that almost 20 members of the 101st were members of an elite Special Forces group known as Task Force 160. The significance of this fact is great, considering that the role of the Multinational Force and Observers is peacekeeping. In contrast, Task Force 160's main objectives are covert missions and rescues, as demonstrated by their suggested involvement in the Italian cruise liner, Achille Lauro, hostage situation. The forces were poised and ready to pounce, although the hijackers surrendered first...
The only possible logic surrounding the entrance of such highly specialized personnel in a peacekeeping force, is that the MFO itself was used as a base for other, more covert, activity in the region... Colonel Oliver North had been negotiating with Iran for some time for the release of American hostages being held in that country. As an exchange for the release of the hostages, North was selling the Iranians TOW anti-tank missiles for use in its ongoing war with Iraq. In late November, 1985, the Iranians paid over $24 million for the purchase of 18 HAWK anti-aircraft missiles. However, upon delivery and testing of one of the HAWKs, the Iranians realized that they had received an older, less technologically advanced version of the HAWK which had a much lesser range that the new ones. The Iranians, already carrying a great distrust of the U.S., felt double-crossed. Oliver North was told by one of his advisors that there was a "good chance of condemning some or all of the hostages to death in a renewed wave of Islamic Jihad." Oliver North responded saying that the deaths of the hostages would be our "minimum losses."...
Realizing his position, the possibility exists that Oliver North planned a covert hostage rescue attempt. North knew the position of the hostages to the exact room of the barracks they were being held in... If this attempt failed and there were casualties in the Special Operations group, this might explain the contents of the "coffin sized" boxes being loaded into the plane in Cairo...
The Governments' Lines
Although there have not been any governmental investigations which have sufficiently satisfied the family members and others who would like to know what actually happened in Gander, the government of the United States has conducted inquiries that examine the U.S. government's involvement in the investigation. In December of 1990, the House of Representatives conducted a two-day hearing on the accident. Many top governmental officials presented their testimony concerning their agencies' roles in the post-crash investigation. Gen. Crosby and Col. McMeekin were present, and answered most questioning with military precision. However, on several occasions when congressmen drilled for answers, Crosby would interrupt and speak on behalf of McMeekin, when McMeekin seemed to be verbally cornered. The subcommittee adjourned on December 5, concluding nothing of great proportions. The hearings had been the result of growing pressure from families and a select few congressmen, the final verdict stating that the "Subcommittee is dismayed and troubled by the failure of the U.S. Government to pursue an active role in the investigation of the Gander accident."...
On October 28, 1988, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded its internal investigation into the accident, although it resulted in no single conclusion. A group of nine board members split 5 to 4 on the ruling of the cause of the accident...
Conclusion
Over ten years have passed since the crash of the homeward-bound DC-8 in 1985. Still, may questions remain unanswered. Although many details of the accident have remained a mystery, many more have been uncovered which may provide insight into the true cause of the disaster...
Theories abound in a case such as this, and I would like to offer my own theories behind this crash.
* The mysterious wooden boxes were the bodies of Special Forces soldiers killed in a hostage rescue attempt.
* A bomb, or some other incendiary device, was placed into the "B" cargo hold of the plane at one of its two stops before heading back to the U.S...
* The explosion onboard the aircraft did not cause it to explode in mid-air, but rather rendered it uncontrollable and caused a massive system failure before crashing.
* The Special Forces units on the aircraft were sent to rescue the hostages held in the Middle East. Oliver North realized that the hostages would probably be killed in retaliation for the bad shipment of HAWK missiles sent to Iran. He knew that he could face serious consequences for his actions if the hostages were harmed. The peace keeping agenda in the Sinai would provide an innocent platform from which to launch such an operation.
It is important that the public know about governmental wrongdoings. Although it may seem that there was no intentional or blatant cover-up, further investigation proves that the inadequate and incomplete investigation of this incident means substantially more than coincidence. A complete investigation is needed that will examine all aspects of the crash, including the pre-crash events, the post-crash investigation, toxicological findings, as well as the "arms for hostages" connections. Unlike the Kennedy assassination, another famous potential governmental conspiracy, the players in this game are still alive and within the population and should be probed for answers. Our servicemen and women are not expendable, for along with the 248 servicemen and women, 248 sons and daughters died as well.
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ARROW AIR INC.
DOUGlAS DC-8-63 N950JW
GANDER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.
NEWFOUNDLAND
12 DECEMBER 1985
REPORT NUMBER 85-H50902
DISSENTING OPINION
by
N. Bobbitt
L. Filotas
D. Mussallem
R. Stevenson
14 November 1988
Ce document est églament disponible en français
Introduction/Summary
In our judgement, the wings of the Arrow Air DC-8 were not contaminated by ice - certainly not enough for ice contamination to be a factor in this accident. The aircraft's trajectory and performance differed markedly from that which could plausibly result from ice contamination. The aircraft did not stall. Accordingly, we cannot agree - indeed, we categorically disagree - with the majority findings.
The available evidence convincingly shows that the right outboard engine was producing little power before it contacted trees. The investigation of the other engines was inconclusive with regard to pre-impact status. We believe it possible that these engines were also operating at reduced power. All four thrust reversers may have been deployed.
The evidence shows that the Arrow Air DC-8 suffered an on-board fire and a massive loss of power before it crashed. But, we could not establish a direct link between the fire and the loss of power. The line may have been associated with an in-flight detonation from an explosive or incendiary device. Consequential damage to various systems precipitated the crash.
Crew Competent and Alert
Associates of the flight crew unanimously testified that all three members were above average in thoroughness and proficiency...
We found no basis for supposing that the crew's performance could have been affected by fatigue. In the absence of evidence of abnormal behaviour and in consequence of testimonials to the crew's professional competence, we conclude that no act or failure to act by any member of the crew contributed to this accident.
No Ice Contamination
No Ice on the Aircraft
The findings of the majority with respect to ice contamination are based on theoretical possibilities, We confuted these in detail in our paper Critique of the Ice Contamination Hypothesis Presented in Conditional Draft No. 1 (presented to the Board in May 1988).
The majority has adduced no direct evidence of ice on the aerodynamic surfaces of the Arrow Air DC-8, the only evidence of ice anywhere on the aircraft is one reference to a small amount on an unheated edge of a windshield. This reference was made by a refueller who spoke with the flight engineer in the cockpit just before departure. His words were as follows:
"I noticed some ice buildup around the edges of the cockpit window, and I asked him if they picked up much ice on the way in. He said, 'No it wasn't too bad, there's a tiny bit left around the window.' "...
...Two refuellers who could not fail to see the leading edge while connecting the fuel hose to the refuelling panels (see Figure DO1) testified that they saw no ice. Had de-icing been necessary, it could have been provided on a fee-for-service basis. None of the four ground handlers who would have done the work noticed any ice. Earlier that morning, one of these workers recommended de-icing to the captain of an aircraft that had been at the airport for some time. This witness stated that the Arrow Air DC-8 did not need de-icing because there wasn't any ice on it.
The witness testimony and the detailed meteorological evidence (as presented at the Board's public inquiry and discussed in our previously cited paper) establish that the wing of the Arrow Air DC-8 could not have been contaminated with ice during the take-off run at Gander on 12 December 1985.
The Aircraft Did Not Stall
The majority based its finding that the aircraft stalled mainly on interpretations of the heading, vertical acceleration, and altitude traces from the flight data recorder. The aircraft's attitude at first contact is cited as supporting evidence. Our paper Critique of the Ice Contamination Hypothesis .... particularizes why both categories of evidence are unconvincing.
We observed, for example, that the alteration in heading is more consistent with a gentle turn than with a stall. We also submitted that the "substandard" vertical acceleration trace (discussed but not reproduced by the majority) provides no support either for or against the notion of a stall.
...The conclusion that the aircraft did not stall can be drawn from evidence of a number of witnesses about the level attitude of the aircraft as it crossed the TransCanada Highway. ("It was a normal departure... but that levelling-off effect was abnormal"; "The aircraft's attitude appeared to be level as it crossed the Trans-Canada Highway"; "The plane was levelled off. The plane wasn't nose up or nose down. It was level"; "It looked very flat. Just two or three degrees"; "The nose was not pointed up": "The aircraft was pretty level... Very level.")
In conclusion, the Arrow Air DC-8 did not stall before it crashed.
Performance Not Consistent With Ice On Wings
Our paper Critique of the Ice Contamination Hypothesis ... also points to misinterpretations of the performance calculations reported by the majority.
The computer models (and the flight simulator modifications) extrapolated lift and drag values beyond the range of experimental data. The resulting steeply rising drag curve generated very large increases in drag for modest increments of angle of attack. Thus, the calculations allow minute amounts of "equivalent roughness" to overpower all four engines at take-off power...
The calculations cited by the majority take no account of the turn and sideslip which we feel are essential features of the accident flight path. The stall presumed in the calculations should at least coincide with the beginning of the turn. Those cases that lead to approximately correct altitude gain and distance show no such coincidence.
We noted in our (previously cited) paper that the flight data recorder indicates a deceleration near the end of the short flight on the order of what would be produced by aerodynamic drag on the standard (i.e., not iced up) aircraft with all engines stopped. The computer program cited by the majority can be used, not only to verify this, but also to find a better fit to the known characteristics of the accident flight - through the assumption that the engines start to spool down shortly after liftoff...
Pre-Impact System Failures
Power Lost Before Crash
There is no doubt that all engines were turning just before the crash, nor that the right outboard engine (the number four engine) was turning slower than the others. But air passing through a jet engine keeps it turning even after an in-flight shutdown, so rotational speed does not necessarily equate to power production.
...The bottom of the number four engine case was crushed both front and rear. The fractured blades on the first two (low pressure) compressor stages indicate that the (low pressure) shaft was in fact turning as the front of the engine was crushed; that is, the engine was either windmilling or producing some (unknown amount of) power at this instant. The turbine stages, attached to the same shaft as these compressor stages, were damaged as the back of the case was crushed an instant later. These turbine stages "exhibited relatively little rotational damage." In fact, there is no detectable rotational damage on the final turbine stage. When the engine case was crushed against it, rotation had already ceased.
...Witness 1: "The airplane passed right over my truck. When it passed right over us, the engines were not running. I did not hear any whine from the engines. I had gone by there hundreds of times when planes were taking off and you could hear the engines. But I could not hear the engines yesterday. There was no whine but there was some type of rumble... I'm certain that when the aircraft passed over its the engines were not working."
Witness 2: "I heard the noise. I looked. I could see the plane coming over. It didn't sound like engine noise... I live fairly close to the Sydney Airport and I've heard planes taking off before. This one didn't sound right.... There was no roar from him at all".
This "ear witness" testimony is all the more striking since the engines would sound louder than normal as the aircraft flew lower than normal over the trucks.
To us, spooling down of all engines provides a more plausible explanation of the tremendous deceleration than does a massive increase in drag due to 0.03 or O.04 inches of ice on the wing.
Thrust Reversers May Have Been Deployed
The sliders on the lower tracks of all four thrust reverser assemblies suggested that the reversers had not been fully forward (that is, not latched in the stowed position) at the time of impact. The position of the number four thrust reverser doors further suggested that they had been deployed prior to impact. The majority concluded that the displacement of all the reverser assemblies (translation rings) and the damage to the number four unit were due to rearward "dragging action during impact." Thus, the majority ruled out in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser as a factor in this accident.
A different appreciation of the evidence may be gained by considering how the rotational damage on all engines establishes the direction of the initial impact force...
...We also note that the S-shaped bends in the number four thrust reverser lower track (evident in Fig. 1.10.) suggest buckling due to compressive forces. The apparent failure in tension of the attachment links of the deflector door mechanisms also suggests failure during forward movement. These observations support the hypothesis that the reverser was driven forward by decelerative forces...
Multiple Malfunctions
The majority concluded that the Arrow Air DC-8's flaps were extended to the expected 18-degree takeoff position even though the wreckage yielded inconclusive and contradictory evidence....
In-Flight Fire/Explosion
Witnesses Saw Fire
On the day after the accident, one of the witnesses who saw the aircraft pass over his truck testified, "I think the right-hand side of the aircraft was on fire." He later explained that the "yellow/orange glow" seemed to come from the right-hand side "fairly close to the body" and it was so intense that he could see writing on the aircraft's tail. When asked to locate the source of the glow at the Board's public inquiry, he pointed to the cargo compartment at the juncture of the right wing and the fuselage.
The other eyewitness who saw the aircraft pass directly overhead said, "My first impression of the glow was that it was a fire." He could only say that the glow came from the "bottom side" of the aircraft. It was bright enough to illuminate the cab of his truck. This witness also noted that he lived by an airport and this light was not like any other he ever saw on an airplane.
The eyewitness who saw the aircraft pass in front of him from right to left stated. "I couldn't see the right-hand side of the airplane. But I could tell that it was very bright on that side of the plane, like something was on fire."
A witness who is not mentioned by the majority observed the take-off run of the Arrow Air DC-8 from a parking lot near the Gander Airport terminal building. This witness saw the Arrow Air DC-8 taxi out, heard the take-off, and then saw a flash and what appeared to be a "large orange oval object" which then "blew up" and "went into a million pieces". The witness located this "object" low in the sky in a direction that would have placed it on the extension of the runway somewhere close to the Trans-Canada Highway...
Medical Findings Questioned
Lethal levels of combustion products in toxicological samples show that a large number of victims continued to breath while exposed to fire. Based on the Official Registration of Death certificates, which describe death as instantaneous for all victims, we would have to conclude that there was a fire on board before the crash.
In April 1988, consultants for the Board reexamined injury patterns recorded during the autopsies. They concluded that many of the victims could have survived for up to five minutes. Analysis based on this finding led the majority to impute all evidence of inhaled combustion products to post-impact exposure. This implies that several victims must have been decapitated after surviving the crash and inhaling lethal combustion products.
A consulting pathologist who studied the available information independently advised us that the analysis of the majority does not rule out the possibility of a pre-impact fire. We understand that injury patterns do not provide definitive indication of survival time, or more specifically, of the time the victim continued to breath after injury...
We also note that the medical examinations found that all injuries consistent with a blast wave or shrapnel from an explosion could also have been sustained during the crash. Nevertheless, the medical report submitted in support of the majority finding indicates that "an explosion within a cargo area might then have its effects on passengers deflected and thus leave no trace on the victims."
Significant Circumstances
A variety of indirect, circumstantial evidence gives substance to eyewitness testimony suggesting a fire on the lower right-hand side of the fuselage. Such a fire may also explain the evidence of seemingly unrelated systems failures.
The majority explains that "considerable speculation" about an in-flight detonation "was fuelled by the fact that military personnel and equipment were aboard the flight and by the increasing world-wide incidence of terrorist activity. Also contributory to this speculation was the point of origin of the flight ... ."
...The security arrangements at Cairo take on added significance in light of the bomb that exploded aboard a TWA 727 in April 1986, tearing a hole in the fuselage and killing four passengers. The bomb was reported to consist of a small amount of plastic explosive about the size of two cigarette packs of a design favoured by Palestinian terrorists. It exploded under the seat of a passenger who had boarded in Cairo and left the aircraft during a stopover in Rome.
The day after the Arrow Air disaster, a group calling itself the "Islamic Jihad" claimed responsibility. We understand that the claim was made to the media and also by means of a telephone call from Lebanon to the CASB headquarters in Hull on 13 December 1985.
The "Islamic Jihad" or "Islamic Holy War", a secretive pro-Iranean terrorist group had previously claimed responsibility for two separate car bombings of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, murder of the president of the American University of Beirut, laying mines in the Red Sea, and the kidnapping of American, Russian, and French nationals. The organization had demonstrated great sophistication in the use of explosives and may have been responsible for the terrorist attack that killed 241 American members of the multinational peacekeeping force at Beirut Airport in October 1983...
In July 1985, five months before the Arrow Air accident, the "Islamic Jihad" claimed responsibility for a bomb attack that killed 27 at Copenhagen, Denmark. Anonymous spokesmen for the organization announced that the attack was in retaliation for raids in Southern Lebanon and warned that terrorist operations would no longer be confined to the middle east.
At the time of the Arrow Air accident, the U.S. government was negotiating with the "Islamic Jihad" for the release of six American hostages.
The remaining factor leading to "considerable speculation" of in-flight detonation noted by the majority concerns "the fact that military personnel and equipment were aboard the flight."
On 26 February 1986, an incident described as a "catastrophe waiting to happen" occurred at Norton Air Force Base near San Bernardino, California. A bag being loaded on a DC-8 military charter broke open, revealing contraband explosive material. A search of the baggage found a variety of detonator cords, machine gun ammunition, blasting caps, slap flares, and other explosive materials.
Another military charter was involved in a similar incident at Oklahoma City on 19 April 1986. A precautionary search after a bomb threat "resulted in the recovery of various items of military ordinance which were being transported without authorization as souvenirs."
A bulletin issued by the Director of Civil Aviation Security noted that "among the items recovered was a trip flare with the triggering pin loosened. rendering it extremely dangerous." It went on to note that "if the trip-flare had been set off a magnesium fire would have resulted." The bulletin also stated that "the U.S. Army Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit disclosed that the item, if triggered, would have resulted in a severe fire and probable crash of the aircraft."
...A magnesium fire resulting from accidental detonation of a "trip flare" in a forward cargo compartment could produce an intense glow with no apparent flames as it bums through the lower fuselage. The intense heat generated by such a fire could destroy control cables and other systems with unpredictable, catastrophic results. In addition to multiple system failures, the consequences could include false cockpit warnings. The crew may be disabled. If not, they may be unable to raise the landing gear, may discharge a fire bottle, and may even attempt to abort the take-off.
In short, a single hypothesis of fire or explosion in a cargo hold can explain many aspects of the accident which need diverse and at times far-fetched assumptions with the ice-contamination hypothesis. These include contradictory evidence about engines, thrust reversers, and flaps; right turn and yaw despite full opposite control; failure to raise the gear despite loss of airspeed; an intentionally discharged rim bottle; inconsistent EPR and N1 tachometer readings.
We would expect much of the evidence of in-flight detonation or fire to be obliterated by the subsequent ground fire. Moreover, we would also expect that meticulous scrutiny of the wreckage might uncover definitive residual signs.
Incomplete Wreckage Analysis
The section "Fire Investigation" in the International Civil Aviation Organization's Manual of Accident Investigation outlines techniques for examining wreckage to determine if a post-crash ground fire could have masked evidence of an earlier in flight fire...
The examination of the wreckage conducted in support of the majority findings was described as follows:
"All wreckage was recovered from the site and moved to a secure hangar at the Gander Airport, where it was arranged in a grid pattern which matched the grid pattern established at the site. A thorough examination of the wreckage was completed, and further selected components were forwarded to the CASB's Engineering Laboratory in Ottawa."
We understand that the examination of the wreckage in the hangar was completed in several days. There are no records of attempts to reconstruct the aircraft from the remaining parts" in order to detect or disprove the presence of pre-crash fire, wreckage not selected for forwarding to Ottawa was bulldozed into piles and later discarded. Accordingly, our efforts to evaluate the evidence for signs of in-flight fire had to be based on an incomplete photographic record.
Hundreds of photographs were taken of the vast destruction at the accident site. Most of the wreckage is unrecognizably fragmented. and the random scatter of the debris seems to belie a sequential breakup. We could not conduct a systematic review since the photographs not needed to support the majority analysis were not organized or labelled. An index relating specific items to the survey grid was not available.
We were particularly interested in the continuity of soot patterns between the edges and frames of doors, emergency exit. and access hatches. As can be seen on Figure DO4., sections of the fuselage with missing doors and windows and evidence of heat discoloration were available for study. We do not know how many doors were recovered, but photographs show that a number were available for analysis. Figure do5 shows one of the emergency exits. Soot around the edges and blistering of the paint indicate that it had been exposed to severe fire . An attempt to mate this exit with its frame may have helped establish whether the fire occurred in the air or on the ground...
In the absence of documentation and explanation of apparently anomalous photographic evidence, we were unable to accept the majority's attribution of all burn damage to post-crash fire.
There is also evidence of detonations on the aircraft. Firemen who arrived on the accident scene some 15 minutes after the crash noted some 30 to 40 explosions, some of which were large enough to cause "mounds of rubble to lift several feet into the air." The majority attributes these explosions to "normal bursting of pressure vessels ... due to the heat of the fire." But pressure vessels are equipped with safety valves precisely to prevent explosion. More detailed consideration suggests the possibility of both post-crash and pre-crash detonations from explosive devices.
An explosive expert acting as a consultant for the insurer examined some of the wreckage in the hangar at Gander. He believed he found evidence of an in-flight explosion. This evidence included a roughly circular hole some 11 inches in diameter in a fuselage sidewall. The hole, located just above the floor line in the passenger cabin, seemed to be punched out explosively. The fuselage section showed no damage other than the outward pucker around the hole (Figure DO10). The partial window frame above the hole seems to be distorted outward as if from an internal blast...
Our own examination of photographs of the wreckage found more evidence of possible explosions. Figure DO11. shows a substantial explosively ripped hole apparently on the underside of the aircraft. Figure DO12. shows an interior view. We could not establish the location on the aircraft, but the wide extent of battered and crushed ribs might be supposed to be the result of impact by material blown about by an explosion. Additional detail shown in Figure DO13. shows chips removed with no apparent local deformation. Such damage suggests high fracture rates typical of explosions.
A host of complex control breakdowns could ensue if the kind of battering illustrated in Figure DO12. were to occur in the ceiling of a forward baggage compartment where cables pass on way ro the engines and flight controls. Such common cause failures could account for seemingly improbable simultaneous runaway flaps, in-flight deployment of thrust reversers, along with inability to raise the landing gear.
We accept these and similar photographs as convincing evidence of an in-flight fire and possible evidence of an in-flight explosion. But, in view of the nature of our review, we cannot reasonably speculate on the resulting damage to aircraft systems.
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Conclusions
Findings
The following findings are further to, or in contrast with, those of the majority:
* Members of the cockpit crew performed their duties without apparent fault.
* Weight and balance considerations were not factors in this accident.
* Ice contamination was not a factor in this accident.
* The right outboard engine (the number four engine) was operating at low power before contacting trees.
* All four thrust reversers may have been deployed prior to impact.
* Fire broke out on board while the aircraft was in light, possibly due to a detonation in a cargo compartment.
* The determination of the causes and factors that led to this occurrence was severely hampered by the lack of information that could have been provided by a thorough effort to analyze and reconstruct the wreckage.
Causes
An in-flight fire that may have resulted detonations of undetermined origin brought about catastrophic system failures...
For details of the Gander scam visit: http://www.sandford.org/gandercrash/
___________________
THE GANDER SCAM
Names of Passengers Murdered in Gander, Newfoundland Plane Crash. The Conspirati, The Enterprise, The Boss Hogs rubbed them out.
How do we know when these thugs rub out the victims?
(a) There are no survivors
(b) No proper investigations
(c) The official version has a lot of holes.
The Kentucky New Era, Hopkinsville, Ky, reported (Dec 16, 1985):
...
ALABAMA
Davis, Jimmy D ; Spec 4 ; . ; Aliceville , Al
Highfill, Joe W ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Daleville , Al
Hughes, Frank J ; Staff Sgt ; . ; North Carrollton , Al
Simmons, Carl N ; Pfc ; . ; Banks , Al
Turner, Vincent L ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Huntsville , Al
Winston, James A ; Staff Sgt ; . ; West Birmingham , Al
Wright, John R ; Spec 4 ; . ; Daleville , Al
ARKANSAS
Kidd, Timothy Linn ; Sgt ; . ; North Little Rock , Ar
Long, Paul D ; 1st Lt ; 24 ; Pine Bluff , Ar
Stewart, Randy S ; Sgt ; 21 ; Texarkana , Ar
Thomas, Randall K ; Sgt ; 31 ; Springdale , Ar
Walker, Guy W ; Spec 4 ; 22 ; Jacksonville , Ar
ARIZONA
Barber, Daniel Mark ; Spec 4 ; 24 ; Flagstaff , Az
Danielson, Thomas ; Spec 4 ; . ; Mesa , Az
Hobbs, Kevin S ; Pfc ; . ; Flagstaff , Az
McArdle, Paul A ; Sgt ; . ; Winslow , Az
CALIFORNIA
Andreoff, Steven A ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Antioch , Ca
Burdette, James D ; Spec 4 ; . ; Lancaster , Ca
Carter, Gregory T ; Pfc ; . ; Covina , Ca
Chaddock, Garett R ; Pfc ; . ; Lake Isabella, Ca , Ca
Gonzales, Michael J ; Spec 4 ; . ; La Puenta , Ca
Graham, Kelly O ; Pvt 2 ; . ; San Jose , Ca
Jackson, Adrian D ; Pvt 1 ; . ; Los Angeles , Ca
Millett, John M ; Sgt ; . ; Idyllwild , Ca
Padgett, Gary W ; Spec 4 ; . ; Vista , Ca
Pevey, Terry R ; Spec 4 ; . ; Port Heuneme , Ca
Spears, James M ; Spec 4 ; . ; Costa Mesa , Ca
Wallace, Brian E ; Pfc ; . ; Canoga Park , Ca
COLORADO
Serna, Ernest W ; Pvt 2 ; 20 ; Denver , Co
Sloan, Matthew S ; Spec 4 ; . ; Lakewood , Co
Stephens, Dane ; Spec 4 ; 19 ; Littleton , Co
Tucker, Thomas N ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Goldon , Co
DELAWARE
Haller, Brian D ; Capt ; . ; Wilmington , De
Kuehn, John M ; Spec 4 ; 22 ; Wilmington , De
FLORIDA
Beer, Edward M ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Orlando , Fl
Brasfield, Tony L ; Spec 4 ; . ; Panama City , Fl
Britt, George A ; Spec 4 ; . ; Lighthouse Pt , Fl
Bury, David A ; Pfc ; . ; Panama City , Fl
Ferguson, James A ; Sgt ; . ; Orange Park , Fl
Graham, Thomas Lyle ; Spec 4 ; . ; Jacksonville Beach , Fl
Hart, Robert B ; 2nd Lt ; . ; Miami , Fl
Hobbs, Donald Ernest ; Spec 4 ; . ; Palm Harbor , Fl
*Jeffcoat, Marvin A * ; Lt Col ; . ; Tallahassee , Fl
Kee, Jeff S ; Spec 4 ; . ; Pensacola , Fl
Kiser, Bruce E ; Pfc ; . ; Jacksonville , Fl
Schmoyer, Ricky A ; Spec 4 ; . ; St Petersburg , Fl
Smith, Thomas E ; Pfc ; . ; Brooksville , Fl
GEORGIA
Bauman, Eric Joseph ; Spec 4 ; 19 ; Warner Robins , Ga
Benson, Wyatt David ; Spec 4 ; 19 ; Forsyth , Ga
Lawrence, Michael R ; Maj ; . ; Atlanta , Ga
Lynch, Benjamin R ; Pfc ; . ; Macon , Ga
Searcy, Blanchard T ; Pfc ; . ; Sylvester , Ga
Smith, Clinton D ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Conyers , Ga
Word, Virginia Ruth ; Spec 4 ; 20 ; Warner Robins , Ga
IOWA
Mullins, Steven W ; Spec 4 ; . ; Des Moines , Ia
Phillips, Alvin ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Oakaloosa , Ia
IDAHO
Bradshaw, Steven J, ; Spec 4 ; 20 ; Boise , Id
Crawford, Paul M ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Nampa , Id
ILLINOIS
Craig, Michael E ; Pfc ; . ; University Park , Il
Gayton, Anthony Lovell ; Spec 4 ; . ; Robbins , Il
Goree, Joseph W ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Edwardsville , Il
Lundgren, David C ; Spec 4 ; . ; Chicago , Il
Richardson, Gregory W ; Pfc ; . ; Sterling , Il
Wilburn, Darnell ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Chicago , Il
Witmer, John B ; 2nd Lt ; . ; North Brook , Il
INDIANA
Arvin, Roger D ; Spec 4 ; 27 ; Evansville , In
Dumpert, Brian Lee ; Sgt ; . ; Marion , In
Mayhew, Ronald C ; Sgt ; 24 ; Indianapolis , In
Miller, Larry G ; Sgt ; . ; Loogootee , In
Miller, Timothy E ; Spec 4 ; . ; Noblesville , In
Murray, Michael ; Sgt ; . ; Washington , In
Robertson, Vergil L Jr ; Sgt ; . ; Spencer , In
KANSAS
Banks, Bobby L ; Spec 4 ; . ; Junction City , Ks
Yeargan, Cary T ; Pfc ; . ; Newton , Ks
KENTUCKY
Black, Hasland O ; Cmd. Sgt ; . ; Lafayette , Ky
Bradley, John T Jr ; Spec 4 ; . ; Winchester , Ky
Carter, Troy G ; Capt ; 40 ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Cruz-Salgado, Francisco ; Pvt 4 ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Englebert, Christopher ; Spec 4 ; . ; Louisville , Ky
Grala, Douglas F ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Manion, Edward John ; Capt ; 30 ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Martin, Thomas L ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Louisville , Ky
Moore, Samuel Theodore Jr ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Nelson, Donald C ; Sgt 1st Class ; . ; Hammond Hts , Ky
Nichols, Richard Sidney ; Sgt ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Owens, Gregory Allen ; Pvt ; 21 ; Louisville , Ky
Palmisano, Jeffrey R ; Sgt ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Parris, Rudy ; CW3 ; . ; Hopkinsville , Ky
Phillips, James D Jr ; Sgt ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Powell, Barry C ; 1st Lt ; . ; Madisonville , Ky
Rahr, Michael R ; Spec 4 ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Robinson, Thomas E Jr ; Sgt ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Scott, Gary L ; Spec 4 ; . ; Oak Grove , Ky
Sellner, Timothy D ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Smith, Rex V ; Sgt 1st Class ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Smith, Scott John ; Spec 4 ; . ; Louisville , Ky
Stone, Earl C ; CW2 ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Thompson, Danny C ; Sgt ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
Witt, Kevin Michael ; Sgt ; . ; Fort Campbell , Ky
LOUISIANA
Alexander, Herbert D ; Pfc ; . ; Ponchatoula , La
MASSACHUSETTS
Aponte, Ivan R ; Spec 4 ; . ; Boston , Ma
Gerdes, Scott W ; Pfc ; . ; Pittsville , Ma
MARYLAND
Duckworth, James Frederick ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Westernport , Md
Heidecker, David W ; Pvt 1 ; 21 ; Westminster , Md
Hoyer, Robert S ; Spec 4 ; . ; Pasadena , Md
Stearn, Alexander W ; Pfc ; . ; Lutherville , Md
Thornton, Christopher G ; Sgt ; . ; Tacoma Park , Md
Whiteman, Michael L ; Spec 4 ; . ; Dunkirk , Md
MICHIGAN
Andrews, Danell ; Spec 4 ; 22 ; Detroit , Mi
Guerra, Richardo ; Pfc ; . ; Ferndale , Mi
Karadsheh, Ibrahim ; Sgt ; 25 ; Warren , Mi
Parsons, Thomas F ; Sgt ; . ; Washington , Mi
Wisson, Theodore M ; Spec 4 ; . ; Port Huron , Mi
Wyn, Robert ; Pfc ; . ; Sherwood , Mi
Ziegler, Cathleen M ; Spec 4 ; . ; Novi , Mi
MINNISOTA
Kubic, Mark R ; Staff Sgt ; 25 ; Brooklyn Park , Mn
Nolan, Michael T ; Pfc ; . ; Plymouth , Mn
MISSOURI
Easley, Brian E ; Sgt ; . ; Independence , Mo
Stack, Michael Shayen ; Spec 4 ; . ; St Louis , Mo
Straub, Gary L ; Pfc ; . ; Benton , Mo
Williamson, James H ; Spec 4 ; . ; Waynesville , Mo
MISSISSIPPI
Holliman, Jerry W ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Coldwater , Ms
Staten, David C ; Pfc ; . ; Pontotoc , Ms
MONTANA
Wallace, Mark E ; Pfc ; . ; Bozeman , Mt
NORTH CAROLINA
Arrowood, Stuart N ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Fayetteville , NC
Buchanan, Gregory A ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Bakersville , NC
Carter, Mark E ; Sgt ; . ; Fayetteville , NC
Edmonds, Kyle L ; Capt ; 28 ; New Hill , NC
Johnson, Jerrin Andrea ; Pvt 1 ; . ; Fayetteville , NC
Johnson, Ravon Leroy ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Eaton , NC
Morgan, Lindale ; Pfc ; . ; Enfield , NC
Perry, Vickie S ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Enfield , NC
Rawls, David L ; Pfc ; . ; Fayetteville , NC
Shook, James Emerson ; Pfc ; . ; Fayetteville , NC
Simmons, George Henry ; Spec 4 ; . ; Wilmington , NC
NEBRASKA
Olson, Robert L ; Pfc ; 20 ; Omaha , Ne
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Eastman, Michael C ; Capt ; . ; Plymouth , NH
NEW JERSEY
Cordero, Miguel Angel ; Sgt ; . ; Paterson , NJ
Davis, Thomas E ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Woodbury , NJ
NEVADA
Bowen, John P ; Sgt ; . ; Las Vegas , Nv
Mathis, Donald Lee ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Las Vegas , Nv
NEW YORK
Bostwick, Paul J ; Pfc ; . ; Binghamton , NY
Brilya, William R ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Hudson Falls , NY
Campbell, Trevor ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Brooklyn , NY
Coleman, Bobby Lee ; Pfc ; 20 ; Rochester , NY
Hemingway, Paul C ; Sgt ; . ; Staten Island , NY
Jennings, Todd Martice ; Spec 4 ; . ; Yonkers , NY
Nelson, Kenneth J ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Falconer , NY
Rimiller, Richard D ; Pfc ; . ; Bloomingdale , NY
Sears, Ronald W ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Bronx , NY
Stringer, Richard ; Spec 4 ; . ; Dexter , NY
Thomas, Robert F ; Spec 4 ; . ; Roslyn , NY
Travis, Theodore ; Sgt ; . ; Niagara Falls , NY
OHIO
Brady, Darrin P ; Pfc ; . ; Brunswick , Oh
Caudill, Phillip R ; Pvt ; . ; Cincinnati , Oh
Daniels, Walter G ; Pfc ; . ; Columbus , Oh
Harris, Brian D ; Pfc ; . ; Canton , Oh
Napier, Michael A ; Spec 4 ; . ; Middletown , Oh
Reasbeck, Patrick S ; . ; . ; Adena , Oh
Seitz, Frederic C ; Pfc ; . ; Aurora , Oh
Wilson, Rodger L ; Spec 4 ; . ; Dayton , Oh
OKLAHOMA
Wolford, Robert Neil II ; Sgt ; . ; Tulsa , Ok
OREGON
Fuller, Paul Koerner ; Cpl ; . ; Portland , Or
Hassing, Mark S ; Pvt 1 ; 20 ; Portland , Or
Hull, Jeffrey D ; Pfc ; 19 ; Cornelius , Or
Shultz, Robert D ; Pfc ; . ; Veneta , Or
Venneri, Steven C ; Pfc ; 19 ; Flagstone , Or
PENNSYLVANIA
Council, Orlando F Jr ; Pfc ; . ; Philadelphia , Pa
Deckman, Herbert R ; Pfc ; . ; Steeltown , Pa
Fink, Kevin F ; Pvt 2 ; 23 ; Dayton , Pa
Haugsdahl, Reginald ; Spec 4 ; 20 ; Erie , Pa
Lloyd, William Michael ; Pfc ; 21 ; Philadelphia , Pa
Schremp, Peter E ; Sgt ; 24 ; Pittsburg , Pa
Shipley, Michael D ; Spec 4 ; 27 ; Huntingdon , Pa
Stritch, Scott A ; Pvt 2 ; . ; Annville , Pa
Thompson, Scott Bryan ; Spec 4 ; 22 ; South Waverly , Pa
Wester, John Charles ; Pfc ; 19 ; Pittsburg , Pa
Wilkins, Franklin R ; Pvt 2 ; 20 ; Shamokin , Pa
RHODE ISLAND
Spearman, Mark ; Pvt ; . ; Woonsocket , RI
SOUTH CAROLINA
Bittle, Sammy Dale ; Pfc ; . ; Cheraw , SC
Brown, Johnny L ; Pfc ; . ; Sumter , SC
Diventura, Joseph L ; Cpl ; 21 ; Summerville , SC
McWhite, Calvin ; Spec 4 ; . ; Columbia , SC
Ruth, Ray A ; Spec 4 ; . ; Walterboro , SC
Singleton, Earl ; Sgt ; 30 ; Hugger , SC
Walker, Gregory ; Spec 4 ; . ; Manning , SC
Ward, Abraham ; Sgt 1st Class ; . ; Chester , SC
SOUTH DAKOTA
McCleery, Christine M ; Spec 4 ; . ; Rapid City , SD
TENNESSEE
Avillan, Luis A ; 1st Lt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Brancato, Charles F ; Sgt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Davis, James A ; Sgt ; . ; Knoxville , Tn
Dixon, Thomas D ; Spec 4 ; . ; Sequatchie , Tn
Ferguson, Mark W ; Spec 4 ; . ; Kingsport , Tn
Foskey, Thomas J ; Cpl ; 22 ; Clarksville , Tn
Givens, Gary Lynn ; Sgt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Godsey, David L ; Sgt 1st Class ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Harden, Benny J ; CW3 ; 38 ; Clarksville , Tn
Ivy, Herbert Guy ; Cpl ; . ; Knoxville , Tn
Jennings, Donny K ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Jones, Joseph A ; Sgt ; . ; Knoxville , Tn
King, Robert M ; Capt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Kosh, John K ; 1st Lt ; 27 ; Clarksville , Tn
Lane, Randall A ; Spec 4 ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Malone, Jerry W ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
McCook, Robert F ; 1st Sgt ; . ; Woodlawn , Tn
McCormick, J Scott ; 2nd Lt ; 24 ; Bristol , Tn
Miller, Dirk A ; CW2 ; 30 ; Clarksville , Tn
Nelson, Steven R ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Pafford, Theodore L ; Pfc ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Rains, Terry L ; Capt ; 29 ; Clarksville , Tn
Reynolds, Jessey T ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Jamestown , Tn
Roberts, Wilbur Grant Jr ; Staff Sgt ; 28 ; Clarksville , Tn
Stevens, Kip L ; 2nd Lt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
West, Thomas E ; Sgt 1st Class ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
White, Emery S III ; Staff Sgt ; late 20's ; Clarksville , Tn
Willingham, Richard N ; Sgt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
Wooliver, William L ; Sgt ; . ; Clarksville , Tn
TEXAS
Cartwright, Dennis ; Pvt 1 ; . ; Silsbee , Tx
Cupples, Troy R ; Pfc ; . ; Porter , Tx
Gray, Christopher ; Spec 4 ; . ; Alvarado , Tx
Hardeman, Chester D ; Pvt 1 ; . ; Dallas , Tx
Hughes, Charles W ; Spec 4 ; . ; Cleburne , Tx
King, Jerry J ; Pfc ; . ; Fort Worth , Tx
McCarty, Joey ; 1st Lt ; . ; Canyon Lake , Tx
Miller, Richard Dean ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Tyler , Tx
Roberts, Bobby E ; Spec 4 ; . ; Fort Worth , Tx
Wheeler, Frank C ; Spec 4 ; . ; Odell , Tx
VIRGINIA
Bowen, Robert ; CW3 ; . ; Wytheville , Va
Colby, Stephen R ; Spec 4 ; . ; Colonial Beach , Va
Hansen, William W III ; Pfc ; . ; Stafford , Va
Kirby, Thomas James ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Salem , Va
Puntanen, Raimo K Jr ; Spec 4 ; 20 ; Chesapeake , Va
Russell, Ronald C ; Pfc ; . ; Portsmouth , Va
Vinson, Wayne ; Pfc ; . ; Chesapeake , Va
WASHINGTON
Kaplin, Robert S ; Spec 4 ; . ; Gig Harbor , Wa
Lineberry, Donald G ; Sgt ; . ; Olympia , Wa
Reed, Melvin W ; Pvt ; . ; Tacoma , Wa
Wood, Lawrence A ; Staff Sgt ; . ; Everett , Wa
WISCONSIN
Schultz, Keith Mitchell ; Pfc ; 19 ; Schofield , Wi
WEST VIRGINIA
Abrams, Mark Edward ; Pfc ; . ; Rhodell , WV
Gantzer, Kevin A ; Sgt ; 22 ; Wheeling , WV
Hileman, Thomas T ; Pfc ; , ; Fairmont , WV
Jordan, David A ; Pvt 2 ; 21 ; Winfield , WV
Mollett, James Albert ; Sgt ; 22 ; Kermit , WV
WASHINGTON, DC
Fitch, David ; Spec 4 ; . ; Washington
GUAM
Nertia, Joseph A ; Sgt 1st Class ; . ; Tumon
PUERTO RICO
Gonzalez, Roberto ; Pfc ; . ; Quebradilla
Ocasio, Francisco Jr ; Sgt ; . ; Juana Diaz
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