Ramzy Baroud's Blog

The data provided in the US State Department's annual terrorism report for 2007 points to some interesting if puzzling conclusions. The much publicised document, made available 30 April via the State Department's website, makes no secret of the fact that Al-Qaeda is back, strong as ever. It also suggests that violence worldwide is nowhere near subsiding, despite President Bush's repeated assurances regarding the success of his "war on terror".

Will the report inspire serious reflection on the US's detrimental foreign policy and its role in the current situation?

Let's look at some of the data. To start with, take Pakistan. Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda-inspired attacks in the country more than doubled (from 375 to 877) between 2006 and 2007. These attacks have claimed the lives of 1,335 people, compared to 335 in a previous report. That is a jump of almost 300 per cent.

Then there's Afghanistan, which was supposedly "liberated" shortly after 11 September 2001. The number of attacks reported there increased a sharp 16 per cent in 2007. Some 1,127 violent incidents killing 1,966 people represent a significant surge in violence compared to 2006's 1,257 deaths.

There have also been many other violent incidents around the world, including but not limited to North Africa, the terrorist bombings in Algeria in particular.

But this is barely half the story -- or 40 per cent of it, if we want to be as specific as the terrorism report. Iraq accounted for 60 per cent of worldwide terrorism fatalities.

Considering the fact that the horrifying violence currently witnessed in Iraq was unheard of prior to the US invasion of 2003, will the Bush administration take a moment to connect the dots? Even a third grader could figure this one out: the US occupation was a major, if not sole factor, in Iraq's relentless bloodbath. In order to right the wrong in Iraq, the US military should clearly just withdraw, and Bush -- or whoever next claims the White House -- should stop fabricating pretexts to justify a prolonged mission.

On 1 May 2003, President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq. As he stood on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln a huge banner behind him bore the words "Mission Accomplished". The New York Times then wrote, "the Bush administration is planning to withdraw most United States combat forces from Iraq over the next several months and wants to shrink the American military presence to less than two divisions by the fall."

Instead, more than five years after Bush's speech, the administration seems determined to maintain a military surge, having added 20,000 soldiers. Making no apologies for the war's contribution to an increase in terrorist activities, Bush's officials continue to rationalise the surge as a commonsense response to ongoing violence, conveniently omitting the US's own part in this violence. The State Department report doesn't classify any of the thousands of innocent victims killed by US or coalition forces as victims of terrorism.

Russ Travers, deputy director of the Counterterrorism Centre, stated on the day the report was published, "It's a fair statement that around the globe people are getting increasingly efficient at killing other people." While Travers' assertion is undoubtedly true, there seems to be no intention of providing any context, no connection drawn to the US's direct invasions, or indirect but equally devastating role in campaigns of violence, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan.

But what the State Department's terrorism report didn't fail to do was once again identify Iran as the world's "most active" state sponsor of terrorism. As reported in the Associated Press on 1 May, Iran was responsible for "supporting Palestinian extremists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, whereة elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps continued to give militants weapons, training and funding."

The irony is that the report further contributes to the US's long-touted case for war against Iran; ironic because the report's findings, if viewed responsibly, substantiate the claim that the Bush administration's policies have only made the world more unsafe. Wouldn't a war against Iran hike up the number of violent or terrorist incidents?

It also remains unclear how powerful Al-Qaeda really is, and how much of its capabilities were hyped in order to enable the Bush administration to continue its mission. Consider the two occasions Al-Qaeda was back in the news recently.

News media cited official Afghani reports attributing the recent assassination attempt on US-ally Afghani President Hamid Karzai to Al-Qaeda. In other reports, the US rationalised its own assassination of a leading Somali militia leader Aden Hashi Eyrow on 1 May as targeting a key Al-Qaeda member. It's not the logic of the assassination that is key here, but rather the fact that while Al- Qaeda has reached a position of strength that can penetrate several layers of defences in Afghanistan, the US is getting itself involved in a regional feud in Somalia. Why would the Bush administration be chasing Al-Qaeda in Somalia, as in Iraq, if the group is reportedly in the most powerful position in Afghanistan?

Moreover, if Al-Qaeda indeed exists on such a large and influential scale in so many countries, isn't it time to question the logic used by the Bush administration's "war on terror" that was meant to weaken and destroy Al- Qaeda in the first place?

It may be, of course, that Al-Qaeda's power and outreach is inflated for political reasons, where every conflict the US is involved in becomes immediately reduced to those who support, shield or host Al-Qaeda or Al- Qaeda inspired groups, thus justifying US military intervention anywhere.

Instead of dealing with the obvious truths that the terrorism report highlights, the authors of the report have resorted to another logic that places blame squarely on external circumstance, never holding the US government accountable for its actions.

Finally, is there really a need for lengthy reports that cost large sums of money and thousands of work hours if the lessons gleaned are always the wrong ones, leading to more blunders that prompt more violence, and more terrorism reports?

On February 12, 2008, Arab League information ministers issued a communique
outlining 'tough' guidelines for Arab satellite channels. The new guidelines
specifically prohibited the broadcasting of negative reporting of heads of
state, religious or national figures. 

In following days, a massive campaign of denunciation, led by those who felt
targeted by the new policy, joined by various rights organizations, ensued. The
communiqué was unfair, they argued, because it was largely political, and aimed
at protecting from censure the very individuals and institutions that have
brought about many of the ailments afflicting Arab societies and governments. Of
course, they were correct. 

How can the media in the Arab world fulfil its duties - as a platform from
which civil society is able to monitor the state, and hold to account those who
deviate from the principles of the relevant social and political contracts –
under such ‘guidelines’? 

While only two countries – Qatar and Lebanon – refused to sign, many
intellectuals, journalists and rights advocates protested. However, Abd A-Rahman
A-Rashid, general manager of the Dubai-based Al-Arabiya satellite channel, told
the Media Line website that the Arab ministers’ guidelines were largely
ineffectual and would not stop the spread of information. 

The story in the West naturally generated immense interest; for once again
Arabs were wrangling with issues of freedom of expression, a value for which
successive US administrations have supposedly advocated.

More, forums were abruptly held where the official transgressions of Arab
governments were candidly chastised. In its monthly policy discussion, the
Brookings Centre Doha raised the question: ‘Forward or backward? The 2008 Arab
satellite TV charter and the future of Arab Media, society and democracy’.
Speakers included Saad Eddin Ibrahim, professor of Political Sociology at the
American University in Cairo, Ibrahim Helal, deputy managing director, Al
Jazeera English, and Michael Ratney, Charge d’Affaires at the American
embassy. The session was chaired by Hady Amr, director of the Brookings Doha
Centre and fellow at the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at the Brookings
Institute. The Saban Center at the Brookings Institute is headed by Martin
Indyk, former US Ambassador to Israel, and despite his personal dedication to
the cause of Israel, remains one of the most frequent guests on Arab TV
stations. 

What is painted to look like a classic conflict between corrupt governments and
their fed up constituencies, the former labouring to gag the latter’s freedom
of expression, is a lot more convoluted. It is not that the corrupt elites are
not indeed labouring to suppress dissent, or that the suppressed multitudes are
not fiercely fighting back. In fact, it’s this relationship that constitutes
the push and pull which came to define Arab media in the first place. But who
has decided that Arab satellite stations – or pan Arab print publications or
other forms of media – represent in any way the interests of Arab masses, or
have improved in any measurable way the welfare of Arab people, especially the
poorer, discounted classes? 

More, how could entities such as the Brookings Institute and its Saban Centre
– known for holding and promoting policies that hardly deviate from that of
the US administration, if not its most rigid qualities - become themselves
mediators for such freedoms, which if genuinely granted would prove most harmful
to the US administration and its interests in the Arab world? 

So is the true state of Arab media, marred with confusion, uncertainty and
mixed messages. 

Since the advent of Aljazeera in 1996, something fundamental morphed in the
world of Arab media. We have heard this argument numerous times and for good
reason. True, but rash conclusions of ‘the Aljazeera revolution’ no longer
suffice. 

Aljazeera was not the only media forum that allowed for the expression of
tabooed views, while censoring others. Egypt’s Voice of the Arabs, during the
Nasser years, for example, decried reactionary Arab regimes left and right, and
it too enjoyed a large following amongst Arab masses from the gulf to the ocean
and beyond. Media technology has advanced immensely since then, and Aljazeera is
packed with less pan-Arab rhetoric and is much more discreet in its political
leanings. The fact that Aljazeera refrains from any serious criticism of Qatar
and is much more candid in targeting specific Arab countries is overlooked by
many since, frankly the world of Qatari politics is relatively trivial in the
greater scheme of things. 

Since then, numerous copycats have sprung up across the Arab world. Satellite
stations with or without political agendas have grown out of control and now
number over 500. This was accompanied by a massive surge of newspapers and
glossy magazines, most offering next to nothing in terms of content value. It
was a media revolution that lacked true substance, thus impacting little the
collective self-awareness of Arab peoples or the Arab individual’s need for
self-assertion in a time of considerable global transformation. 

Those who are on good terms with the official authorities can easily be granted
a license, and thus a new TV station or new magazine is welcomed into the fold.
Those who are not would only need to relocate to London or another, preferably
hostile Arab capital and resume his media ‘mission.’ Of course, funds for
such endeavours are available on conditions, either to refrain from bashing
certain entities and giving free hand to censure others, or to stay away from
politics altogether. 

With cheap American TV content and their Arab imitators, content per se is
never an issue. It’s quality content that poses a problem. To pretend that
such low quality programs haven’t deeply scarred Arab societies and their
cultural and societal identities is to defy reality, but that is for another
discussion. 

The fact is that Arab media is largely political, with political, religious,
nationalistic, even tribal leanings, affiliations and priorities. While some
media have done less harm than others, none represent the untainted exception. 

The Arab foreign ministers communiqué can be understood as a call for a truce
between various Arab governments: you hold your journalists back from attacking
me, I’ll hold mine. It’s neither a call for the suppression of civil society
nor the gagging of free expression: the former is largely suppressed and truly
free expression never fully existed. 

Two points remain to be made; one is that dominating media in the West is
afflicted by similar ailments, themselves owned by big corporations that pander
to their respective official authorities, with the US being the most notable
example. 

And two, a truly independent media that is completely free from the whims of
individuals or those holding the financial or political leverage is only
possible in theory. What civil society usually aspires to achieve, however, are
mediums that are less bias, less totalitarian and as representative of the whole
as possible. This can only be achieved by collective struggle, organization and
pressure, using home-grown platforms, as opposed to imported ones. 

When civil society organizes and speaks out, neither a communiqué by a few
ministers, nor a decree by a totalitarian ruler can silence it.